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BEWARE OF NUMBERS (AND UNSUPPORTED 
CLAIMS OF JUDICIAL BIAS) 
HARRY T. EDWARDS*  
LINDA ELLIOTT** 
An accusation of unprincipled bias in appellate decision making 
involves a substantive assessment. Such an assessment cannot be 
made without first looking at what litigants have presented to the 
courts and then looking at what the courts have relied upon in 
rendering their decisions.  
In a recent set of articles, Professor Kevin Clermont and Professor 
Theodore Eisenberg advance the claim that federal appellate judges harbor 
an unprincipled bias against plaintiff/appellants.1 The line of reasoning that 
the authors follow to reach this conclusion is, in our view, quite 
extraordinary. They first point to data that they claim show that defendants 
are more likely than plaintiffs to secure reversals in appeals from judgments 
and verdicts in federal civil cases.2 They next assert that appellate judges 
perceive trial courts, especially juries, to be biased in favor of plaintiffs.3 
And, finally, they speculate that, in an effort to overcome the perceived pro-
plaintiff bias in the trial courts, appellate judges routinely favor defendants on 
appeal.4 The authors dub their conclusion the “anti-plaintiff effect” in federal 
appellate civil litigation.5 This thesis is specious, because it is founded on 
flawed reasoning and deficient empirical research.  
 * Circuit Judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. J.D., University of Michigan, 
1965; B.A., Cornell University, 1962. 
 ** Special Counsel for Legal Affairs, U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit. LL.M in 
Advocacy, Georgetown University Law Center, 1992; J.D., University of Michigan, 1986; B.A., 
Kalamazoo College, 1981. 
 1. Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ 
Advantage, 3 AM. L. ECON. REV. 125 (2001) [hereinafter Defendants’ Advantage]; Kevin M. 
Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Anti-Plaintiff Bias in the Federal Appellate Courts, 84 JUDICATURE 
128 (2000) [hereinafter Anti-Plaintiff Bias].  
 2. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 125, 134-35, 137; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, 
at 129-31. 
 3. See Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 125, 135-36, 138-45; see Anti-Plaintiff Bias, 
supra note 1, at 129, 131-34. 
 4. See supra note 3. 
 5. Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 129. 
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* * * 
As an initial matter, it is not the least bit surprising or disturbing to learn 
that defendants are generally more likely than plaintiffs to secure reversals in 
some types of civil cases, and most especially in appeals from jury verdicts. 
The fact-finding process of a trial judge almost always involves some 
documentation of his or her reasoning, either in a transcript, written opinion, 
or findings of fact. It is therefore less difficult for a party to assign error to a 
judge’s decision than to a jury’s verdict. In any event, if defendants generally 
fare better than plaintiffs in securing reversals, this may be because plaintiffs 
usually carry the burden of proof at trial, so they have more to overcome 
when seeking reversal on appeal. We would also hypothesize that any 
differential in reversal rates is the predictable result of (1) the differing nature 
of appeals brought by plaintiffs and defendants and (2) the structural 
constraints related to the unique functions of trial and appellate courts. In 
particular, we would hypothesize that appeals brought by defendants more 
often involve viable legal issues than appeals by plaintiffs. Legal, not factual, 
issues are the principal work of the appellate courts, so if one group of 
litigants presents more viable legal claims than another, they will win 
reversals at a higher rate. The authors do not consider or choose not to focus 
on these possibilities in their empirical analyses. This is hard to fathom, 
“because in empirical research, challenging a theory with the best possible 
opposing arguments is what makes the strongest case for a theory.”6  
The authors also fail to furnish any credible quantitative or qualitative 
data to support their conclusion that the higher percentage of wins by 
defendant/appellants is a result of appellate judge bias against plaintiffs. 
Instead, they apply their own speculative “attitudinal explanation[s]”7 to 
limited and conclusory data on case dispositions drawn from the public 
records of the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts (“AO”).8 The 
authors’ so-called attitudinal explanations—which purport to explain why 
appellate judges make the choices they do—are not supported by citation to 
any sociological or psychological literature regarding the appellate process or 
the reasoning of appellate judges. Rather, the authors merely rest on 
sweeping generalizations that equate appellate judges with the populace as a 
whole.9  
 6. See Lee Epstein & Gary King, The Rules of Inference, 69 CHI. L. REV. 1, 10 (2002).  
 7. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 141-45; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 132-34. 
 8. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 127-28, 129; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 
129-30. 
 9. The authors assert that appellate judges analyze cases before them in the same manner as the 
general populace. See infra notes 30 and 31 and accompanying text. This defies common sense. This 
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* * * 
The authors are forced to use these frail and speculative “attitudinal 
explanations” because their study design is faulty. They attempt to apply 
multi-regression analyses to information gathered from the AO data base. 
The problem, however, is that while this data base includes a large number of 
cases decided by federal courts, it provides very little substantive information 
regarding what litigants have presented to the courts or what the courts have 
relied upon in rendering their decisions. In other words, the information is 
simply too thin to yield the broad conclusions the authors attribute to it.  
The portion of the AO data base used by the authors consists of thirteen 
categories of federal tort and contract cases terminated in fiscal years 1988 to 
1997—a period of time during which information was gathered by the AO 
from both district courts and courts of appeals.10 The limited substantive 
information contained in the AO data base includes:  
[1] the names of the parties, [2] the subject matter category and the 
jurisdictional basis of the case, [3] the origin of the case in the district 
court as original or as removed or transferred, [4] the amount 
demanded, [5] the dates of filing and termination in the district court 
or the court of appeals, [6] the procedural stage of the case at 
termination, [7] the procedural method of disposition, and, [8] if the 
court entered judgment or reached decision, who prevailed.11  
To arrive at their conclusion on judicial bias, the authors first ascertained 
the appeal rate by looking to terminated district court cases that reached the 
appellate docket.12 They narrowed that set of cases to those that involved 
“district court judgments formally for one side that the other side put[] on the 
appellate court docket.”13 They defined the reversal rate as the percentage of 
assertion is also at odds with “the considerable body of social psychological research that teaches us 
that human behavior is highly sensitive to context.” Deborah R. Hensler, Beyond Prosletyzing: Some 
Thoughts on Empirical Research on the Law 5 (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Washington 
University Law Quarterly) [hereinafter Prosletyzing]. 
 10. After eliminating duplicate case records and adjusting for cross, consolidated, and reopened 
appeals, the authors used the district court docket numbers and filing dates to match the district court 
data to the appellate data. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 128-29; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra 
note 1, at 130.  
 11. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 127-28. See also Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 
129-30.  
 12. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 129.  
 13. Id.; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 130. Initially, the authors assumed that if the district 
court judgment was for the plaintiff, the defendant was the appellant. However, upon closer 
examination of the parties’ names on the ensuing appeals, they discovered that more than 25% of the 
appeals from judgments for plaintiffs were filed by plaintiffs. The authors subsequently dropped these 
cases from their data base. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 129; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 
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that group of appeals that reached a “decisive outcome” and were categorized 
as “reversed,” “remanded,” or “affirmed in part and reversed in part.”14 
Affirmed cases were defined as those categorized as “affirmed” or “dismissed 
on the merits.”15 Performing a series of regressions comparing whether the 
plaintiff or defendant won “with other independent variables of case 
category; jury trial; year; district; status as a reopened appeal or not; and 
origin status as original, removed, or transferred,” the authors concluded that 
the “plaintiff-win variable” was the only variable that had “an important 
effect on reversal rate.”16  
This analysis, limited as it is by the nature of the data available in the AO 
data base, shows nothing more than formal outcomes in certain civil cases. 
The data show virtually nothing about the appellate courts’ decisions 
justifying the formal outcomes. The data likewise offer no information on 
appeals that were withdrawn (or the reasons for the withdrawals) or settled 
(or the reasons for the settlements). The authors also fail to look behind the 
formal labels of “reversal,” “remand,” or “affirm” to determine whether 
some of these cases were merely pyrrhic victories for the supposed winner. 
As any practicing attorney knows, the formal disposition of a case may be 
very deceiving if it is not considered in conjunction with the written opinion 
rendered by the court.  
Finally, the data upon which the authors rely include absolutely nothing 
about the issues raised by the parties before the appellate courts (nor the 
issues that were raised in trial and then dropped or waived on appeal); the 
quality of advocacy on appeal; or the appellate courts’ bases for the decisions 
rendered in the cases that are included in the study. It seems clear to us that 
an empiricist cannot possibly assess the outcomes in appellate litigation to 
determine whether appellate judges are biased against certain parties without 
first gathering and then considering data of this sort. We will amplify this 
point in the discussion that follows. 
* * * 
The first thing that we discovered upon careful review of the authors’ 
articles is that there are several caveats to their assertion that defendants in 
civil jury trials succeed “significantly”17 more often than plaintiffs in winning 
reversals on appeal. 
1, at 130 n.4. 
 14. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 129; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 130. 
 15. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 129; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 130. 
 16. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 135 n.18.  
 17. Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 128. 
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First, it turns out that not all federal circuits fit the authors’ claim of 
appellate bias. A footnote in Appeal from Jury or Judge Trial: Defendants’ 
Advantage [hereinafter Defendants’ Advantage] admits that the authors did 
not find a higher reversal rate for defendants in the D.C. Circuit.18 In that 
same footnote, the authors also acknowledge that, while “almost all circuits . 
. . show the defendants’ higher reversal rate, some show it insignificantly and 
others show it substantially.”19 The authors dismiss this finding in a single 
sentence: “These variations in local culture are consistent with an attitudinal 
explanation.”20 In short, the authors assert that variations in the degree of 
alleged anti-plaintiff bias among circuits can be explained by cultural 
differences. Yet, the authors offer no definition of “local culture,” let alone 
one that might correlate with circuit boundaries. And, more fundamentally, 
they never explain where this assertion comes from or on what it is based.  
The authors’ data also admit of several caveats relating to the size of the 
differential across case categories.21 Given the principal purpose of this 
essay, however, no good point will be served by cataloguing each of these 
limitations. 
The second thing that struck us upon a close read of the articles was that 
the authors’ own numbers do not support their conclusion that appellate 
judges decide cases pursuant to a “fear of pro-plaintiff bias at the trial court 
level.”22 The authors reason that if appellate courts are “leaning toward 
undoing trial court and jury trial favoring of plaintiffs”,23 there should be “a 
perceptible difference between personal injury . . . and non-personal injury 
case categories, as the latter type rests less on the format of little victim 
against big defendant.”24 They further argue that, because appellate judges 
mistrust juries more than trial judges, the biggest difference in plaintiff and 
defendant reversal rates should show up in personal injury jury trials and the 
smallest in non-personal injury judge trials.25 This is what the authors find in 
the numbers highlighted in the table reproduced in pertinent part in Table 1. 
Based on these limited data, the authors conclude that whenever trial courts, 
and especially juries, are suspected of acting on a pro-plaintiff bias, “the 
 18. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 142 n.32.  
 19. Id. (emphasis added).  
 20. Id. See also Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 133 (parenthetically admitting to the same 
caveat with respect to variations among the circuits). 
 21. See Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 136-38.  
 22. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 136. 
 23. Id. at 138. 
 24. Id. at 138-39. 
 25. Id. at 139. 
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appellate courts step in to favor the defendant.”26  
The authors’ empirical study simply does not support their conclusion. 
There are three reasons for this: First, even assuming the authors’ table 
provides a useful starting point, it cannot support their claim because they fail 
to consider alternative explanations for their numbers. Second, the authors 
have not done the work necessary to unearth the quantitative empirical data 
that they need to actually test their thesis. In other words, their empirical 
methodology is flawed. So no matter how the numbers are analyzed, they 
cannot prove the point that the authors hope to make. And, third, the authors’ 
crucial premise—that federal appellate judges perceive trial courts, especially 
juries, to be biased in favor of plaintiffs—is not based on any credible 
quantitative or qualitative empirical evidence. We address each of these 
points in turn.  
* * * 
First, upon review of the authors’ table, it is immediately apparent that 
there are a number of viable explanations for the data. For one thing, it is not 
really surprising that there is a significant defendant/plaintiff differential in 
three of the four categories of cases shown in the table. (These figures are 
highlighted in the second version of the table shown in Table 2.) In our 
experience, defendant/appellants rarely challenge findings of fact. In contrast, 
our sense is that plaintiff/appellants, who almost always carry the burden of 
proof at trial, are more often forced to rely on what are essentially factual 
claims, although they may, at times, be artfully clothed as “legal error.” If we 
are right, defendants are likely to have a predictable advantage on appeal. 
Why? Because trial courts are owed great deference in their findings of fact, 
whereas viable legal arguments mandate de novo review and so are much 
more likely to capture the attention of appellate judges.  
Another plausible explanation that the authors have not seriously 
considered is the effect of skillful lawyering.27 Looking to the highlighted 
 26. Id. at 139, 141. See also Anti-Plaintiffs’ Bias, supra note 1, at 131 (setting forth the same 
analysis). As corroboration of their conclusion, the authors point to defendant/plaintiff reversal rates 
categorized according to whether the litigants were governmental or non-governmental entities, 
corporations or individuals, foreigners or domestic parties, and in-staters or out-of-staters. Defendants’ 
Advantage, supra note 1, at 139; Anti-Plaintiffs’ Bias, supra note 1, at 131. None of this “evidence” 
overcomes the basic flaw in Professor Clermont’s and Professor Eisenberg’s analysis. That is, none of 
the data takes account of the records presented to, arguments made before, and written decisions of the 
appellate courts.  
 27. See, for example, Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 138 & n.24 and 148 n.49, where 
the authors make passing reference to, but dismiss without serious analysis, the potential effect of 
skillful lawyering on appellate outcomes.  
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figures in Table 3, it is apparent that the reversal rates for plaintiffs appealing 
in non-personal injury cases decided by both judges and juries are higher 
than plaintiffs’ respective reversal rates in personal injury cases. The 
disparity may reflect a difference in quality of counsel. Plaintiffs’ counsel in 
non-personal injury appeals may appear more frequently before appellate 
courts and may be better at finding and framing arguments in terms of the 
legal issues that provide judges with the greatest leeway in ordering reversals 
or remands.  
The effect of better appellate counsel may also be in play elsewhere. The 
circled figures in Table 4 show that, in trials before a judge, plaintiffs in non-
personal injury cases fare much better in securing reversals than do plaintiffs 
in personal injury cases. The boxed numbers in Table 4 show that plaintiffs 
in personal injury cases fare about the same whether appealing from jury or 
judge trials.  
As indicated above, because appellate judges invariably have before them 
written explanations from trial judges supporting their judgments, we would 
hypothesize that all parties generally have a better chance of securing 
reversals in appeals from judge trials than in appeals from jury verdicts. It is 
simply easier when appealing from a judge-tried case for a party to assign 
error. However, if plaintiffs’ counsel in personal injury cases are less 
experienced in appellate advocacy than plaintiffs’ counsel in non-personal 
injury cases, they may not be able to capture this potential judge-trial 
advantage. This would explain the nearly identical reversal rates for plaintiffs 
appealing from both judge- and jury-tried personal injury cases. Conversely, 
if plaintiffs’ counsel in non-personal injury cases are generally more 
experienced in appellate advocacy, then they would be expected to be able to 
capture the advantage of judge-tried cases. The substantially higher rate of 
reversals for plaintiffs appealing from judge-tried non-personal injury cases 
bears out this prediction. 
In short, the authors’ study is suspect, because they did not address some 
obvious alternative explanations for their data. Judicial bias arguably could 
explain their data results, but they cannot rest on this possibility to support 
the conclusion if there are other plausible explanations that they have not 
seriously considered.  
* * * 
 
The authors’ failure to test their theory against viable opposing arguments 
is a serious flaw in their methodology, but it is not their worst mistake. The 
principal problem with the authors’ “anti-plaintiff effect” thesis is that it is 
based on a flawed empirical study. Simply stated, the authors have not done 
the work necessary to find the data needed to test their thesis. Their data base 
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is too sparse. As a result, no matter how they analyze their data, they cannot 
prove the point that they hope to make. This is why their claim of judicial 
bias is not credible. 
A careful empiricist will test his or her chosen explanation of an 
identifiable data trend, first, by investigating additional variables and 
considering alternative explanations based upon those variables, and, second, 
by applying a validity screen to any surviving explanations.28 Had the authors 
followed this methodology here, they would have acknowledged that the 
only way to fairly assess whether appellate courts are biased in their 
decision-making is to look at what is presented to the judges by the parties. 
Appellate review is limited to the record that comes from the trial court, and 
appellate judges may only consider arguments that are presented to them. If 
an attorney fails to present an argument, it is normally waived. So an 
empiricist cannot possibly assess whether the judgments of an appellate court 
are biased without knowing what the appellate judges were asked to decide.  
The data that the authors use—conclusory numbers from the 
Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts—allow for neither of the prescribed 
tests. They merely show whether a case was affirmed, reversed, remanded, or 
dismissed.29 Without more, these data demonstrate virtually nothing about 
the quality of decision-making by appellate judges. An empiricist would also 
have to look at the parties’ briefs and the courts’ decisions to know whether 
there is systematic bias against plaintiffs in appellate judgments. 
One question that the authors would have to answer in order to fairly test 
the credibility of their thesis is the following: “Do defendant/appellants more 
often rely on viable legal claims than plaintiff/appellants when seeking 
appellate review?” In other words, is it true, as we suspect, that defendants 
are more likely than plaintiffs to seek reversal on the basis of viable claims of 
“legal” error and, therefore, are more likely to obtain favorable decisions 
from appellate courts? 
The authors’ failure to consider this possibility is particularly puzzling 
given the ease with which it can be empirically tested. Briefs and opinions 
(both “published” and “unpublished”) furnish a readily available bank of 
information that can be coded and analyzed to determine the degree to which 
defendants rely on legal claims and plaintiffs rely on factual arguments, as 
well as the degree to which each controlled in the rendering of particular 
decisions. A review of this information would also reveal something about 
the quality of advocacy.  
 28. See, e.g., Epstein & King, supra note 6, at 9, 38, 76-80, 87-97. 
 29. See supra the text accompanying notes 12-16.  
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This is the kind of quantitative empirical data that an empiricist must 
consider before endorsing a claim of the sort propounded by the authors. And 
it is no answer to say that it is easier to use raw data from the Administrative 
Office of the U.S. Courts. An empiricist cannot justify using weak data on 
the grounds that it would be inconvenient, time-consuming, or boring to 
collect reliable data.  
When we turn to the authors’ crucial premise—that federal appellate 
judges perceive trial courts to be biased in favor of plaintiffs—the problem 
gets worse. The authors cite no credible evidence to support their premise. 
Rather, they intuit that, because appellate judges are human, one cannot 
expect them to be immune to the “misperceptions of the liability crisis [that] 
pervade the populace and the profession.”30 Not only is this sheer conjecture, 
it also ignores the fact that the essence of appellate judging is the principled 
application of legal rules. The authors’ views are not surprising, because they 
appear to be quite cynical about appellate judges. In Defendants’ Advantage, 
for example, the authors say that, while “[a]ttorneys’ misperceptions [of the 
trial system] are subject to the correction of actual adjudication, . . . appellate 
judges are free to exercise their biases without any check.”31 This self-
serving description of appellate judges aims to advance the authors’ claim of 
judicial bias, but it is not based on any concrete data. In fact, the authors 
point to nothing to show that appellate judges routinely “exercise their biases 
without any check.” Judges with whom we are familiar work very hard to 
apply the law, not personal biases, and they are “checked” by the law, their 
oath of office, judicial codes of conduct, and one another.  
* * * 
Not only did the authors fail to do the work necessary to unearth the 
quantitative empirical data needed to test their thesis, they also failed to 
undertake a qualitative analysis of their “anti-plaintiff effect” theory.32 
Through interviews and surveys of appellate judges, the authors could have 
gathered information on the accumulated experience and knowledge of 
judges against which to test their hypothesis. Although there can be reporting 
issues with such surveys, it is hard to imagine that there would not be 
 30. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 142. See also Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 
133. 
 31. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 142. See also Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 
134 (“Most professional people hold anti-jury views, and the appellate judges are in a position to put 
these views into action.”). 
 32. See Harry T. Edwards, Collegiality and Decision Making on the D.C. Circuit, 84 VA. L. REV. 
1335, 1364-70 (1988) (discussing qualitative analysis and the interpretation of data). 
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something to be gained by attempting to ascertain whether appellate judges 
actually hold the view that trial courts inappropriately favor plaintiffs.33  
Professor Deborah R. Hensler, the former Research Director at the Rand 
Institute for Civil Justice and now a widely respected scholar at Stanford Law 
School, argues that, because of the inherent limitations of certain statistical 
analyses, empiricists often must employ qualitative research techniques if 
they are to achieve credible results:  
Multiple regression and its variations . . . are enormously powerful 
tools. But in the absence of theory on which to ground the 
specification of multivariate models, regression acts more like a 
clumsy robot than an intelligent agent . . . . [W]ithout any theories of 
litigation behavior beyond crabbed rational choice models that ignore 
virtually all of the realities of modern civil legal practice, it’s difficult 
to know how to specify testable explanatory models of lawyer [or 
judge] behavior. And without such theories it is difficult to weave 
together the empirical findings that we do have.  Theory, of course, 
is hard to come by, particularly theories that explain complex social 
phenomena. . . . Teasing out persistent patterns from a morass of 
social and psychological factors that are correlated with legal behavior 
is a daunting task. The best we can hope for are probably “little 
theories” – propositions about how lawyers (and others) are likely to 
behave in a particular set of circumstances. We’re more likely to 
derive these theories from close analyses of behavior in context, using 
qualitative research techniques, than from statistical analyses of 
administrative databases. This is not to say that such databases are 
useless, but rather that we may glean more from them after we have 
formulated theoretical propositions based on other methods of 
analysis.34  
* * * 
If the authors had merely reported that defendant/appellants appear to 
have greater success than plaintiff/appellants in securing reversals on appeal 
in civil cases, their finding would have been interesting but not surprising.35 
 33. “[T]his task is more of an art than a science, but it is important for researchers to recognize 
the continuing importance of qualitative data in civil justice research.” Deborah R. Hensler, 
Researching Civil Justice: Problems and Pitfalls, 51 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 63 (1988) 
[hereinafter Problems and Pitfalls]. 
 34. Prosletyzing, supra note 9 (manuscript at 5-6).  
 35. Even this finding is far from clear, however. As noted earlier, the authors report that the size 
of plaintiff/defendant differentials vary depending upon case category and judicial circuit. See supra 
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Rather than stopping with that finding, however, the authors opted to spice 
their data with “attitudinal explanation[s]”36 for which they have no support 
whatsoever. In other words, the authors resorted to a form of pop psychology 
to attribute “bias” to federal appellate judges. What is really distressing is the 
authors’ apparent attempt to place a mantle of authority on their claim of bias 
by suggesting that it is the unadulterated product of quantitative empirical 
research, when in fact their regression analyses indicate absolutely nothing 
about judicial bias.37 Indeed, the authors’ claim of bias rests on nothing more 
than a specious syllogism: many people in society “imagine a biased and 
incompetent trial system handing vast sums over to undeserving plaintiffs. 
Why should appellate judges, who remain human after all, be immune?”38 A 
conclusion based on this kind of reasoning betrays the glaring frailties of 
empirical analysis. 
Professor Hensler has cautioned that “many of the civil justice 
phenomena that need study are not suited to current quantitative analytic 
techniques. . . . Researchers simply do not have available very good 
quantitative approaches to studying large social organizations or interaction 
processes.”39  
[T]he very factors that make the U.S. civil legal system so interesting 
to study—the wide range of situations that might stimulate legal 
claiming, the wide range of opportunities for strategic lawyering—
when coupled with the lack of public information on correlates and 
outcomes of legal behavior . . . raise huge obstacles to drawing valid 
inferences about legal behavior . . . . The limitations on the data that 
supports most empirical analysis inevitably—and properly, in my 
view—leads to skepticism about the robustness of any conclusions 
drawn from these data. From a methodological standpoint, the 
soundest of analyses are those that carefully limit their conclusions to 
the data at hand and not only specify but underline the limitations of 
the findings.40 
Professor Hensler implies that good empiricists must guard against using 
sparse empirical data to support behavioral conclusions that find no support 
the text accompanying notes 18-20. 
 36. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 141-45; Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 132-34. 
 37. This certainly lends support to the charge that “the current state of empirical legal 
scholarship is deeply flawed.” See Epstein & King, supra note 6, at 6 (emphasis in original). 
 38. Defendants’ Advantage, supra note 1, at 142. See also Anti-Plaintiff Bias, supra note 1, at 
133. 
 39. Problems and Pitfalls, supra note 33, at 63.  
 40. Prosletyzing, supra note 9 (manuscript at 4). 
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in their quantitative data. Professor Clermont and Professor Eisenberg do not 
heed this principle. In advancing their claim of judicial bias, the authors 
make the fatal and unfortunate mistake of trying to extrapolate too much 
from limited data. 
CONCLUDING NOTE BY JUDGE EDWARDS  
Someone who is a participant in a corrupt enterprise may be seen to 
“protest too much” when exposed. Since I am one of the appellate judges 
who has been accused by the authors of unprincipled bias against plaintiffs, 
anyone reading this critique has every right to wonder whether I would admit 
to judicial wrongdoing if the authors had truly proven it. I can assure you that 
I would. As a society, we expect the appellate process to be governed by the 
principled application of legal rules. If there is indeed a bias against 
plaintiff/appellants in appellate decision-making, judges must be made aware 
of it so that we can check ourselves and protect against it.  
Professor Clermont and Professor Eisenberg have dangerously 
oversimplified reality. Their charge of judicial bias is highly inflammatory. It 
suggests that appellate judging is largely a lawless enterprise rather than a 
reflection of the legal merits of particular claims. Such an assertion 
undermines public confidence in the judicial system and must not be made 
lightly or prematurely. An accusation of unprincipled bias in appellate 
decision-making involves a substantive assessment. Such an assessment 
cannot be made without first looking at what litigants have presented to the 
courts and then looking at what the courts have relied upon in rendering their 
decisions. The authors have yet to do this, so they have no good basis for 
accusing federal appellate judges of bias against plaintiffs. 
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